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RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS ON
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
JoHN W. HEIDERSCHEIT III*
There have been two recent reported decisions involving ques-
tions of environmental justice. One decision reviewed the siting of
a landfill and the other was on a petition for review of a Clean Air
Act permit issued to a waste wood-fired electric generating sta-
tion. The cases are examined below, followed by a brief analysis of
their larger implication.
I. AZELLo v. BROWNNG-FERRIS, INC.
In Aiello v. Browning-Ferris, Inc.,' a federal district court held
that a "taking" challenge to a landfill siting decision should have
been raised first in the state court. The court also dismissed stat-
utory civil rights claims as barred by the applicable limitations
period. In January of 1987, Contra Costa County ("County"), Cali-
fornia appointed a task force to recommend future landfill sites for
the County. According to the plaintiffs, in June of 1987, the ap-
pointed task force ranked the Keller Canyon site last among thir-
teen potential sites, in substantial measure because Keller Can-
yon's proximity to residential and commercial areas. At least one
of the areas that ranked higher on the list of potential sites was in
a section of the County near neighborhoods that are predomi-
nately white. The Keller Canyon site was the closest of all the
potential hosts to the residential areas and was predominately
populated by minorities.
Despite the recommendation of the task force against utilization
of Keller Canyon, on November 10, 1988, the County's Board of
Supervisors voted to endorse the siting of the landfill at Keller
Canyon. Construction of the landfill began in November of 1991,
and the landfill commenced commercial operation in May of 1992.
* The author is a partner with Wright & Talisman's, Washington, D.C. office and spe-
cializes in the permitting of new and expanding industrial projects.
1 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,771 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1993).
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Almost immediately following commencement of construction,
there was a large volume of complaints from nearby residents.
Commencement of operation of the landfill only intensified the
complaints. According to the nearby residents, the landfill caused
dust, toxic substances, trash, and odors to be blown into their
neighborhoods. Further, according to the residents, they were dis-
turbed by the sound of heavy equipment and trucks entering and
leaving the landfill.2
On February 8, 1993, a class of residents filed claims against
the County of Contra Costa and its Board of Supervisors under 42
U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1985. 3 The claims alleged that Contra
Costa County violated the residents' constitutional rights by mak-
ing a racially discriminatory decision to locate and approve the
landfill in a part of the County where a high proportion of the
County's minorities reside. The residents' lawsuit also named the
landfill operator, Browning-Ferris, Inc. ("BFI"), as a defendant.
The charges against BFI included an alleged taking of property
without compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Constitution.4 Finally, the residents raised
various state law claims against BFI and the County under a pen-
dant jurisdiction theory. BFI moved to dismiss the residents' tak-
ing claim and the County moved to dismiss the civil rights claims
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6)' for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The court held the residents' civil rights claim was time barred.'
The court first addressed the County's motion to dismiss the resi-
dents' complaint as time barred. Because neither section 1983 nor
section 1985 provide for explicit time limitations, the court looked
to analogous state law. The court found that the statute of limita-
tions under the state rule was one year. As noted above, the resi-
dents' complaint was filed on February 8, 1993. The residents ar-
gued that under the "continuing wrong" doctrine, a cause of action
does not accrue until the time of the final wrongful act. Further,
the statute of limitations should not begin running until after an
2 Id. at 20,771.
3 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 (1988).
4 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
5 FED. R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
6 Aiello v. Browning-Ferris, Inc., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,771, 20,773 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 1993).
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aggrieved party has had a reasonable period to assess the full ex-
tent of its losses.7
The County disagreed and argued that the relevant activity
(and the only decision challenged as discriminatory by the resi-
dents) was the siting decision itself. That decision was made in
1988, but in no event later than July of 1990. Even if the siting
decision did not trigger the limitations period, the County argued
that the statute of limitations began running in November of 1991
when construction of the landfill commenced.8
The district court rejected the residents' arguments and ac-
cepted those of the County. The crux of the court's decision was
that "the gravamen of plaintiffs' complaint is that the decision to
site the landfill was discriminatory."9 The district court clearly
was convinced that the siting decision was the only potential ra-
cially discriminatory act alleged by the residents, and that all of
the adverse environmental consequences sketched out in the resi-
dents' complaint flowed from that single act. Since the County for-
mally approved the landfill plan in 1989, under the district court's
analysis, the statute of limitations began running then, and ex-
pired in 1990. Thus, the civil rights claims were timed barred
substantially before the commencement of suit on February 8,
1993.10
As a last ditch effort, the residents invoked "the well-estab-
lished rule that a civil rights cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff 'knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the
basis of the action.' "" The district court responded that this ex-
ception was inapplicable because it was designed to keep injured
parties out of a catch-22: barred from bringing an action at the
time of injury because damages would be too speculative, and then
later barred by the statute of limitations from bringing an action
when damages are accrued. In the district court's view, there was
"certainly sufficient injury" by the time the landfill construction
7 Id. at 20,773.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 The district court took pains to emphasize that the analysis affected only the resi-
dents' civil rights claim. "Plaintiffs' claims that they continue to be exposed to noise and
harmful wind-borne substances may constitute continuing torts, and may be the effect of a
§ 1983 or § 1985 violation, but such injury does not constitute a continuing civil rights vio-
lation." Aiello v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,771, 20,773
(N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1993).
11 Id. at 20,774.
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began to trigger the commencement of the statute of limitations.
Although the court conceded that "the nature and extent of plain-
tiff's damages might not have been known with precision by Feb-
ruary 1992," the fact that there would certainly be some injury
was sufficient to commence the limitations period. The district
court therefore rejected the residents' invocation of the exception
and dismissed the federal civil rights claims.' 2
The court also found that the plaintiffs' unconstitutional "tak-
ing" claim lacked a valid basis."i The residents conceded that they
had not brought any state claim seeking compensation for a tak-
ing, under the administrative procedures enacted pursuant to the
California State Constitution. The residents argued that Califor-
nia's Constitution did not provide for a takings claim against a
private party, like BFI, and therefore they were excluded from us-
ing the state administrative process to seek relief. The district
court was not so certain and held neither the California constitu-
tion nor the California inverse condemnation statute14 specifically
rule out the possibility that a private party "acting under color of
state law" could be responsible for a compensatory payment.
Before a federal takings claim would be cognizable, the residents
would be forced to sue under state theories and be denied relief.
Because they concededly had not yet done so, the district court
also dismissed the takings claim against BFI. Since the court
found no basis to proceed under the federal law causes of action, it
also dismissed the pendant state law claims. However, the dis-
trict court granted leave to the residents to replead the federal
takings claim, if and when the residents had exhausted an at-
tempt to pursue compensation through state administrative
processes. is
II. IN REGENESEE POWER STATION LIMITED PARTwERSHIP
In In re Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership,'6 the EPA
Environmental Appeals Board ("the Board") denied review of a
claim of environmental racism in connection with Prevention of
12 Id.
13 Id. at 20,772.
14 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1245.260(a) (West Supp. 1994).
15 Aiello, 24 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,772.




Significant Deterioration ("PSD") permit. 17 Holding that Clean Air
Act ("CAA") section 13118 does not authorize review of "local land
use" decisions, the Board refused to grant review. 19 The decision
was later reissued, as explained below, in a way that undercuts
the precedential significance of the environmental racism holding.
The Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership ("Genesee")
applied for a permit to install and operate a 35-megawatt steam
generating electric plant. The cogeneration plant would combust
several types of wood waste, including demolition debris, palettes,
dunnage, construction waste, tree trimmings, and saw mill resi-
due. The plant would be located northeast of Flint, Michigan, in
an industrial park located not far from residential areas. The
Flint, Michigan area is classified as "nonattainment" under the
CAA for ozone. Thus, the Genesee plant was obligated to obtain a
PSD permit under section 165 of the CAA, and a nonattainment
new source review permit under section 173.20 The PSD permit
was the subject of the appeal and issued by the Michigan Pollution
Control Commission ("the Commission") under a delegation of au-
thority from EPA.
The PSD permit application was filed on June 8, 1992. A forty
two-day public comment period and two public hearings were held
prior to issuance on December 7, 1992 of the final PSD permit.
Pursuant to 40 C.F.R. section 124.19, several groups and individu-
als petitioned the Board for review of the permit. The petitioners
included the American Lung Association of Michigan; the Flint
Michigan NAACP; the Society of Afro-American People; the Flint/
Genesee Neighborhood Association; the Genesee County Medical
Society; and several individuals.2
The Board initially ruled that claims of environmental racism
were nonreviewable pursuant to section 131 of the CAA. The Soci-
ety of Afro-American People in Michigan (the "Society") asserted
17 The Environmental Appeals Board is an administrative creation of the EPA adminis-
trator. The Board hears and decides the kinds of appeals formerly delegated to the Agency's
judicial officers. The matters within the Board's jurisdiction include most administrative
enforcement cases and a wide range of federally issued environmental permits. See
Changes to Regulations to Reflect the Role of the New Environmental Appeals Board in
Agency Adjudications, 57 Fed. Reg. 5320 (1992).
18 Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
19 Genesee, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993 P.S.D. LEXIS 1, at *91 to *92 (Envtl.
Appeals Bd. 1993).
20 Id. at *4 to *6.
21 Id. at *10 to *11.
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that the Commission's issuance of the PSD permit to Genesee
"represents an instance of 'governmental environmental racism,'
because the facility will be near the predominantly African-Ameri-
can Flint/Genesee neighborhood." In other words, the Society's
position was that "the inability of people of color and other resi-
dents of the economically deprived area" to be involved in the pub-
lic process associated with permit issuance-particularly as com-
pared to the opportunities afforded to white opponents of other
similar projects-demonstrated illegal "racially discriminatory
intent."22
Figuring most prominently in the Society's analysis was a com-
parison of the treatment of a proposed project that had been slated
for construction in a predominately white area and certain alleg-
edly disrespectful conduct towards black attendees at a meeting of
the Commission to take comment on the draft PSD permit. First,
the Society pointed to a project proposed for Marquette, Michigan.
According to the Society's position, while listening to the opposi-
tion by white residents to a proposed project that would have been
located near a predominately white area, a member of the Com-
mission announced opposition to the project and the PSD permit
was denied. Second, with respect to the conduct at the Genesee
hearing, the petitioners claimed that some project opponents
waited sixteen hours to receive a chance to speak, and only then
were allowed to do so very late at night. Further, there was "talk-
ing" and "laughing" by Commissioners during the presentations.
According to the implication of the Society's petition, this indi-
cated that the Commission already reached a racially discriminat-
ing conclusion prior to holding the public meeting.
The Board declined to grant review of the issue and concluded
that neither the Clean Air Act, nor the PSD regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the CAA authorized the Board to consider com-
munity opposition to the "location" of a proposed facility. Specifi-
cally, the Board cited section 131, which provides that "nothing in
the [Clean Air Act] constitutes an infringement on the existing au-
thority of counties and cities to plan or control land use."23 Accord-
ing to the Board:
22 Id. at *12 to *26.




The legislative history of the above-quoted provision reveals
that its "purpose is to preclude any inference that the Clean
Air Act by its terms, as amended by this bill, authorizes air
pollution control agencies to override individual project-spe-
cific land use decisions made by a city or county.
Under the Clean Air Act, therefore, the inquiry of the state
agency acting in its capacity as a PSD issuing authority under
a federal delegation is limited to determining whether the fa-
cility at the proposed site would meet federal air quality
requirements.2 4
Thus, a project permit may not be reviewed by the Board or de-
nied by the permitting authority, assuming consistency with air
quality requirements, "from a local land use perspective."
Although "mindful" that the permitting authority must consider
non-air quality environmental impacts and "other costs" in mak-
ing a Best Available Control Technology ("BACT") determination,
the Board pronounced that these provisions were not availing to
the Society. The obligation to consider "non-air quality environ-
mental impacts and other costs" is primarily intended to act "as a
safety valve whenever unusual circumstances specific to the facil-
ity make it appropriate to use less than the most effective technol-
ogy."25 Although such non-air quality impacts must be considered
as part of a BACT determination, "this consideration does not ex-
tend to generalized community opposition to the proposed site of
the facility."26
The Board subsequently modified the basis for its decision on
environmental racism. Reportedly, the Genesee decision set off a
firestorm of debate and criticism within the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency. Almost immediately, the EPA Office of General
24 Id.
25 Id. at *21; see In re Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 1989 P.S.D. LEXIS 4, PSD Ap-
peal No. 88-11 (June 21, 1989) (Reilly, Adm'r).
26 The Board noted, however, that if the Commission was also exercising some state au-
thority in issuing the permit, then it could have concluded pursuant to state law that the
permitting decision was motivated by a racially discriminatory intent. As an example of
such a circumstance, it cited issuance of a permit over "intense" opposition from the local
Afro-American community. The Board concluded that it was not clear from the record
whether there was such racially discriminatory intent and that in any event it was unclear
whether any state authority was being exercised in connection with issuance of a delegated
federal permit. Genesee, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993 P.S.D. LEXIS 1, at *21 (Envtl.
Appeals Bd. 1993).
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Counsel filed a "Motion for Clarification" ("Motion").27 The Motion
challenged the legal theory underpinning the environmental ra-
cism aspect of the Genesee decision. The Motion stressed that the
PSD provisions of the CAA called for a "comprehensive review" of
all air quality related issues prior to issuance of a PSD permit.
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
stress that the public hearing on a proposed permit should allow
for consideration, among other things, of possible alternatives to
the project. According to the Motion, this would "plainly" include
the authority to consider requiring that the plant be sited else-
where "if the permitting authority decides to do so based on con-
sideration of community views."
The legislative history, according to the Motion, also demon-
strated the intent of Congress that the "character of a community"
be taken into account in the PSD permitting process. Specifically,
the motion papers stated:
When analysis of energy, economic, or environmental consid-
erations indicates that the impact of the major facility would
alter the character of that community, then the state could,
after considering those impact[s], reject the application or
condition it within the desires of the state or local
community.2 8
Consistent with this broad view of the permitting authority's
scope of review is the increment consumption analysis. Permit-
ting authorities explicitly are authorized under section 165(a)(3)
of the CAA to reject a proposed application where the project con-
sumes excess consumption of "increment"-even where there ex-
ists no violation of National Ambient Air Standard and Quality
Standards.29 According to the Motion, this demonstrated the
Board's error in asserting that "a permitting authority may deny a
permit in the proposed location only if its air quality impact would
violate minimum air quality requirements."
The Board, at least in part, was persuaded by the Motion. Mov-
ing swiftly, on October 22, 1993, the Board issued an "Order On
27 In re Genesee Power Station Ltd. Partnership, PSD Appeal Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993
WL 473846, at *1 (Envtl. Appeals Bd. Oct. 22, 1993).
28 See id. at *1.
29 42 U.S.C. § 7475 (1988).
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Motion for Clarification."3" In the order, the Board, noting that it
was able to decide the environmental racism issue against the pe-
titioners on purely factual grounds, withdrew its previous legal
analysis. It reissued the Genesee opinion without the reference to
whether the Clean Air Act authorized review of claims of environ-
mental racism in citing decisions. The Board stated:
Genesee Power Station Limited Partnership, the permittee in
this case, opposes [Office of General Counsel's ("OGC") Motion
for Clarification] on the merits, although it has no objection to
excising the portions of the Board decision for which OGC
finds fault. Genesee asserts that the issue raised by the Mo-
tion for Clarification is of national importance and should be
decided with the full benefit of the adversary process but are
not so presented here, for the issues raised do not, as OGC
acknowledges, affect the outcome of the case. For that reason,
Genesee proposes that the Motion be resolved by simply excis-
ing the appropriate portion of the decision.3
Therefore, the Board denied review of the environmental racism
claim on the purely factual ground that the petition failed to state
facts that established that MDNR'S judgment on the racism ques-
tion was clearly erroneous.
III. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
The Aiello and Genesee decisions share some common character-
istics and implications. The decisions are important because,
taken together, they probably represent the fact patterns that
will, in the future, most frequently produce legal challenges on en-
vironmental justice grounds. The Aiello case will be the most com-
mon: the siting or expansion of a landfill near residential areas
that are disproportionately minority. Because of business condi-
tions in the waste disposal industry, however, it is likely that
there will be fewer cases than many observers expect involving
new or expanded landfills. The Genesee situation, in contrast,
may be the forerunner of more frequent challenges to air pollutant
sources than may be expected. This is due to many factors, includ-
ing the increasing tendency to build more (but smaller) power
30 In re Genesee Power Station Ltd. Partnership, PSD Nos. 93-1 to 93-7, 1993 WL
473846 (Envtl. Appeals Bd. Oct. 22, 1993).
31 Id. at *1.
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plants than in the past; the effect of the Clean Air Act Title V
operating permit program which is expected to cause hundreds or
thousands of sources to file PSD permit applications; and the gen-
eral tendency to more closely enforce existing preconstruction per-
mit rules.3 2
The most obvious consistency between Aiello and Genesee is
that neither the Aiello plaintiffs nor the Genesee petitioners ob-
tained any relief. This is not terribly surprising since, in the de-
velopment of the law, it often takes several attempts for relatively
novel theories to gain credence. There are relatively few "over-
night successes" for plaintiff's lawyers.
CONCLUSION
In retrospect, the greatest mistake made by the claimants in
Aiello and Genesee may have been failing to prepare for litigation
at an earlier stage in the process. The implication of the district
court's decision in Aiello is that the plaintiffs would have been
more successful if they had brought suit for declaratory judgment
as soon as Contra Costa County finalized the landfill siting deci-
sion. Once a declaratory judgment was obtained, the court could
have retained continuing jurisdiction over the matter to assess an
award of damages. Likewise, the Genesee petitioners may have
benefited from earlier efforts to shape the administrative record.
For example, had detailed studies been prepared of the disparate
impact of the siting decision, the Environmental Appeals Board
decision may have been different. Of course, early and visible
preparation for litigation in many instances can be expected to
produce a more favorable settlement for those injured by discrimi-
nating actions-without the delay, expense, and uncertainty asso-
ciated with recourse to the courts.
32 The majority of these permits will be issued by state air quality agencies and thus,
appeal will be to the state agencies' governing bodies and, after that, to the state courts,
rather than to the Board and then the federal courts.
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